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THE  REGION  AS  AN  EXPORT  PLATFORM
TO  THE WORLD?  THE  CASE  OF  MERCOSUR
ALESSANDRO NICITA, MARCELO OLARREAGA AND ISIDRO SOLOAGA*
“We cannot continue alone. Soon we will have to open up to the whole
Americas and our traders will not have gained the necessary experience
to be successful.”
Roberto Henriquez
(Vice-minister of  Foreign Trade, Panama. Financial Times, February 2000).
“In Mercosur’s closed block, a significant amount of trade is composed of
uncompetitive products, which cannot be exported to other markets.”
Pablo Guidotti (former Deputy Minister of Finance, Argentina. Wall Street
Journal, July 2001).
1. INTRODUCTION
An argument often brought forward, when discussing the benefits of re-
gional integration in Latin America, is that the formation of a larger market may
serve as a platform for (potential) exporters to world markets (Devlin and Ffrench-
Davis, 1999). According to this view, illustrated by the quote of Mr. Henriquez in
the Financial Times (and referring to Central American trade integration), the
region can serve as a “classroom” for potential exporters, where they can learn
“how to export”. Trade preference encourage exports within the region and thereby
exporters can accumulate the necessary experience and reputation to become
reliable and competitive suppliers in world markets.
An alternative view, illustrated by Mr. Guidotti’s quote in the Wall Street
Journal, is that the regional trade preferences only help promote low-quality intra-
regional exports. As tariff preferences increase, uncompetitive exporters enter the
regional market. These exporters will not be able to penetrate more distant markets
with their products and trade preferences will only encourage trade diversion.
* Development Research Group (DECRG), The World Bank.
Email: anicita@worldbank.org;  DECRG, The World Bank, and CEPR, London,
Email: molarreaga@worldbank.org; and Universidad de las Américas, Puebla, Mexico.
Email: isoloaga@mail.udlap.mx, respectively.   We are grateful to Kala Krishna, Daniel
Lederman, Jaime de Melo, Pablo Sanguinetti, Maurice Schiff, Ernesto Stein and
participants at the  “Leitner Conference on Political and Economic Aspects of Regio-
nal Integration” at Yale University, at the Latin American Econometric Society Mee-
ting in Buenos Aires, and at USITC and World Bank seminars for very helpful comments.
All remaining errors are ours. The views expressed here are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the institutions to which they are affiliated.
Cuadernos de Economía, Año 40, Nº 121, pp. 442-451 (diciembre 2003)
A. Nicita.pm6 2/12/03, 9:45 442MERCOSUR  AS  AN  EXPORT  PLATFORM 443
Moreover, the entry of low quality producers into the regional export market can
potentially hurt the overall reputation of regional products. This will be the case, if,
for example, consumers in the rest-of-the-world (ROW) can only observe the ave-
rage quality of products exported within the region rather than firm specific quality.
To some extent the “region as a platform” argument is a distant cousin of
the infant-industry argument for protection. The infant industry argument assumes
that there exists some positive externality between levels of production today and
the competitiveness that can be achieved tomorrow. The region as a platform
argument assumes that there exists a positive externality between exports to the
regional market today and future exports to more distant markets. In the case of the
former, some may advocate (temporary) trade protection in order to encourage
production today. In the case of the latter, (temporary) regional trade preference
are advocated in order to encourage regional trade.
The theoretical literature on infant industry protection has identified the
presence of information barriers as one important justification for government
intervention (Mayer, 1984 and Hoff, 1997).1  Information barriers have also been
identified as being part of the most important problems faced by exporters in
developing countries (Raff and Kim, 1999). Indeed, building good reputation and
trust in foreign markets seems to be as important, if not more important, than in
domestic transactions. Even in countries with a well developed judicial system, an
important share of what makes a successful business deal will typically lie outside
the contract established by the two trading partners (McLaren, 1999). Thus
asymmetric information on the importer side in terms of quality of products and the
reliability of exporters in terms of delivery and credit can become significant barriers
for exporters to distant markets. Similarly, asymmetric information on the exporter’s
side in terms of customs procedures, foreign markets tastes and ways of doing
business can jeopardize their success in distant markets.  Preferential access within
the regional market can help obtain the necessary experience and reputation that
can then help overcome barriers in more distant markets through these “information
spillovers”.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, to identify whether information
generated in one export market can help Mercosur members to increase exports to
other third markets through these information spillovers. (And if yes, whether the
export experience acquired within Mercosur markets is more likely to generate
these export information spillovers than the experience acquired in non-Mercosur
markets?) Second, to search for evidence that the creation of Mercosur, and the
tariff preferences associated with it, have helped member country exporters
overcome some of the barriers associated with exporting to more distant markets.
Mercosur, which was created in 1991 and encompasses Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay is an interesting case study for at least two reasons. First,
differences in size among member countries can help identify asymmetric patterns
1 For a model that shows that the argument for infant-industry protection in the case of
information barriers may vanish if firms can chose the quality of their products, see
Grossman and Horn (1988).
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in the existence of platform effects. Second, although intra-Mercosur exports have
been growing much quicker than extra-Mercosur exports (26 and 7 percent), the
average growth of Mercosur exports to the ROW went from around an annual rate
of 1 percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s to around 7 percent in the late 1990s.
This suggests an acceleration of the rate of integration of Mercosur exporters into
world markets consistent with “region as a platform” hypothesis.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how we
proxy for the presence of information spillovers across export markets and platform
effects associated with regional trade preferences. Section 3 describes the empirical
model to test for the presence of export information spillovers and platform effects
and discusses the empirical results for Mercosur members. Section 4 concludes.
2. MEASURING EXPORT INFORMATION SPILLOVERS AND PLATFORM EFFECTS
To capture the platform effect associated with the acquisition of information
on the reliability of Mercosur exporters by importers in the ROW, and the acquisition
of information on customs procedures and foreign tastes in the ROW by Mercosur
exporters we first need to have a measure for export information spillovers. In order
to do this, one needs a proxy to capture bilateral information flows across countries.
Figure 1 illustrates how export information spillovers at period t-1 (the kink
and dash arrows in figure 1) affect export of a Mercosur country to third markets
(the partner) at period t (the large horizontal arrow). The export performance of a
Mercosur country (call it “0”) in other Mercosur members markets or the ROW at
period t-1 will be transmitted to a third market through information flows (e.g.,
trade in newspapers) and consumers in third markets will learn about the export
performance of country 0 exporters. At the same time exporters in country “0” will
learn more about consumer tastes in the third market when exporting to countries
with which the third market has significant information flows (the dash arrows).
These information flows (the kink and dash arrows) will in turn positively affect
export flows of country 0 to the third market at period t. If export information
spillovers generated in other Mercosur markets increase with the extent of tariff
preferences granted by Mercosur members, one will be observing a platform effect.
2.1. Measuring bilateral information flows
Information flows across countries are captured using the value (in real
terms) of trade in newspapers and periodicals (SITC 8922) between countries. This
includes trade oriented papers such as the Journal of Commerce (US), Export
Channel (US), Made for export (Europe), Asian Channel (Hong Kong), Gazeta
Mercantil Latinoamericana (in Mercosur countries) but also more general journals,
2 Obviously, other explanations are also consistent with this observation. For example,
the Brazilian devaluation in 1994, and some MFN trade liberalization that may have
occurred simultaneously.
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magazines and periodicals. It has several advantages over the more traditionally
used measure of distance. First, it allows for size effects. The amount of information
between Mercosur countries and Mexico is larger than the amount of information
between Mercosur countries and Honduras, though the distance between them is
very similar. Second, it allows to control for cultural factors such as language and
colonial links. Information flows between Mercosur countries and Spain are much
larger than between Mercosur countries and South Africa, though the latter is
closer to Mercosur than Spain.
FIGURE 1
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION SPILLOVERS FOR EXPORT PERFORMANCE
2.2. Measuring export information spillovers
Export information spillovers are defined as the information acquired by
importers, when observing the export performance of foreign producers in third
markets, regarding the quality of products of those exporters. On the exporter side
it includes the information acquired by exporters when exporting to one market
regarding customs procedures and tastes of foreign in third markets. As in Nicita
and Olarreaga (2000) we measure them as the information flow weighted sum of
exporters market shares in all markets in the previous years. The idea is that a larger
market share in an export market will signal a higher quality product to importers in
third markets and this will help increase the demand for these products in third
markets. Thus, the export performance in each market (measured by past market
shares in each market) gets transmitted to other importers through bilateral
information flows across export markets (measured by the share of their newspaper
trade with other market). More formally, if  Nc,t is a vector of share of newspaper
trade between country c and all other export markets of a Mercosur member and
Sp,t-1 is a vector of past market share of the Mercosur member in all of its trading
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partners at period t-1, the inner product of  Nc,t  and Sp,t-1 is our proxy for export
information spillovers.
2.3. Measuring platform effects
In order to test for a platform effect associated with tariff preferences, we
will check how the information spillovers generated in Mercosur members are
affected by tariff preferences granted at the creation of Mercosur. More formally,
following the notation above, the platform effect is captured by:
M




t , c S N T - ￿ = Y where TM is the within Mercosur tariff preference (i.e., the
Common External tariff),3  M
t , c N is the vector of information flows between other
Mercosur members and ROW export markets; and  M
1 t , c S - is the past market share
of a Mercosur member in all other Mercosur markets.
3. IS MERCOSUR AN EXPORT PLATFORM FOR ITS MEMBERS?
The basic empirical model draws on Nicita and Olarreaga (2000). They show
within a simple model with linear demands, constant marginal transport and
production costs, and internationally segmented markets that in the presence of
cross-country spillovers on the demand or supply side, the market equilibrium
implies that exports of product p to country c at time t (denoted  t , c , p x ) are a
function of the size of country c total import demand for this product (denoted
t , c , p a ), distance between the Mercosur exporter and country c( c d ), the past
market share of the Mercosur member in country c( 1 t , c , p s - ) and the export
information spillover received by country c from all other trading partners of the
Mercosur member regarding its export performance (again, measured as the
information flow weighted sum of past market shares in each of these other markets).
In our context, we need to differentiate export information spillovers depending on
whether they originate in other Mercosur members or in ROW export markets. We
also need to include the platform effect variable described above.
Other important determinants of exports are also included in the empirical
specification. First, cultural links may affect our estimates and to capture this we
introduce gravity, which is the total exports of the source country to country c
(purged of product p exports to country c). It can also be interpreted as capturing
all the explanatory variables of a gravity equation for each Mercosur member
(including regional trade agreements with ROW countries).
3 T is equal to zero for all years before 1991 when Mercosur was created. After 1991 it
is equal to the Common External Tariff that was implemented in 1996, which is a
proxy for the extent of internal preferences assuming that countries external tariffs
were not too different from the Common External Tariff and that there intra-Mercosur
imports was all duty-free.
A. Nicita.pm6 2/12/03, 9:45 446MERCOSUR  AS  AN  EXPORT  PLATFORM 447
Second, comparative advantage aspects may also affect our measure of
information spillovers (in some products our source country may be a “natural
exporter” and in others not) and to control for this we introduce ca, which is
defined as total exports to the ROW, denoted ca  (again purged). Third, we also
control for possible within sector (and country) externalities by taking the share of
bilateral exports at the industry level on total imports of country c at the industry
level and denote it industry. Fourth, we include the Common External Tariff (CET)
as an explanatory variable.
Finally, the export equation to be estimated needs to take into account the
non-existence of Mercosur exports in many products across trading partners,
which leads to a large presence of zeroes in the endogenous variables (exports to
the ROW). To correct this bias introduced by censoring we use a Tobit technique:
(1)
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where  Row
1 t N - is a vector of the share of newspaper trade between country c and
ROW countries;  Row
1 t , p S -  is a vector of the Mercosur member past market shares in
each ROW countries.  Their inner product captures the export information spillovers
generated in the Row.  Timet  is a time dummy that controls for any time specific
variable (e.g., exchange rates) and   t , c , p c t , c , p u + n = m is an error term containing
a random country effect ( c n ) to control for other export market countries
characteristics.4  The data and variable construction is discussed in the appendix.
Thus,  0 M > q will capture information spillovers generated within Mercosur
country markets, whereas  > qRow captures the effect of Mercosur member’s per- -
formance in ROW countries on their exports to other third countries;  0 P > q
capture the Mercosur “platform” effect associated with tariff preferences.
3.1 Econometric results
Results of the estimation of equation (1) are provided in Table 1 for each
Mercosur member separately. Interestingly, information spillovers generated in
ROW markets seem to be an important determinant of exports in all four countries
(see first row in Table 1). Thus, the export performance in one third market, does
4 Fixed effect may yield inconsistent estimates when using a tobit method or in the
presence of spatial effects (i.e., spillovers across countries) as discussed by Anselin
(1988).
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seem to affect future export performance in other third markets. Also interestingly,
the regional market seems to be an important generator of information spillovers
only for the smallest members of Mercosur (Paraguay and Uruguay), but not for
Brazil and Argentina (see the second row). This makes sense: large (and perhaps
more advanced) countries constitute a larger share of the regional market and may
have established more of a reputation and export links in the ROW.
TABLE 1
MEASURING MERCOSUR PLATFORM EFFECTa
a The estimation procedure is Tobit. Figures in brackets are standard errors corrected for
country-specific random effects and heteroscedasticity using a Generalized-Huber correction








c,t S N ￿ 16093** 14159** 13757** 39529**




t , c S N ￿ 6159 6145 3871** 6457**
Regional information spillover (4260) (6281) (943) (1356)
M
t , c , p Y
-103243 128404 68007** -43380*
Mercosur Platform effect (58162) (65239) (24410) (20823)
CET -4901** 17964** -2992** 7500**
Common External tariff (307) (3913) (435) (1057)
t , c , p a
0.004** 0.004** 0.2E-03** 0.1E-03**




-0.25** -0.41** -0.05** -0.17**
Distance (0.001) (0.03) (0.005) (0.02)
1 t , c , p s -
17835** 40389** 10227** 29315**
Own-market effect (1495) (2538) (2199) (5576)
ca 0.005** 0.01** 0.08** 0.04**
Comp. Advantage (0.0004) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003)
Gravity 0.012** 0.010** 0.09** 0.04**
Gravity type effect (0.0008) (0.001) (0.008)** (0.03)
Industry 4398** 8370** 5322** 19668**
2-digit Industry spillovers (1216) (1686) (1605) (5547)
Constant -3108** -12390** -2290** -5247**
(308) (1185) (195) (499)
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
Pseudo-R
2
0.03 0.02 0.08 0.06
# observations 89944 91368 65826 85536
% censored obs. 0.59 0.35 0.94 0.87
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Finally, the results reported in the third row do not support a platform effect
associated with tariff preferences, except for Paraguay. The coefficient of
M




p S N T -  is statistically insignificant for Argentina and Brazil suggesting
that there has been no platform effect. In the case of Uruguayan exporters, a
negative and statistically significant coefficient is found. This suggests that the
extent of information spillovers generated in other Mercosur markets was reduced
by intra-block tariff preferences. The exception is Paraguay, which appears to have
obtained reputational benefits from exporting to its larger and more advanced
partners in Mercosur.5
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It has often been brought forward, when discussing the benefits of regio-
nal integration in Latin America, that regional trade preference may allow regional
producers to develop the necessary experience, reputation and know-how to
increase their exports to the ROW. This paper searches for evidence of a “platform”
effect associated with regional trade preferences granted among Mercosur members.
Empirical results suggest that information spillovers generated in the re-
gional market have helped the smallest members of Mercosur penetrate more distant
markets. However, this effect is associated with regional trade preferences only in
the case of Paraguayan exporters. For Uruguayan exporters, the regional trade
preferences have, if anything, reduced the amount of positive information spillovers
that helped them penetrate more distant markets, echoing the concerns expressed
by Mr. Guidotti quoted at the beginning of this paper. One reason may be that
preferential access may actually provide uncompetitive firms the opportunity to
export low-quality products within the regional market. If ROW exporters cannot
observe the quality of individual exporters, but only the average quality of exporters
from one country, then the entry of these low quality exporters in the regional
market may hurt the prospects of other high quality regional firms to export to the
ROW.
In sum, regional markets can indeed be used as a platform for exporters (as
observed in the case of Paraguay and Uruguay exporters), but trade policy in the
sense of regional tariff preferences does not necessarily enhance the role of the
region as an export platform, and it can actually hurt the ability of regional exporters
to penetrate more distant markets.
5 All other variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant.
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APPENDIX:  DATA  AND  VARIABLE  CONSTRUCTION
Trade data is obtained from United Nations Comtrade Data Base for the
period 1980-1998 at the 3-digit level of the SITC classification.  For each of the
Mercosur exporting countries we only use data on products that have been exported
at least once during the period 1980-1998 to at least one market. The ROW is
composed of 54 countries that represent on average over the period more than 85
percent of ROW trade.  All trade data is adjusted to 1997 US dollars (units are
thousands of 1997 US dollars). The bilateral distance matrix is calculated using the
geodesic distance between capitals of different countries.
The variables are constructed as follows:
gravity t , c , p
p
t , c , p t , c x x - ￿ = ;
￿ - =
c
t , c , p t , c , p t , p x x ca ;
t , c , p
T
t , p , c t , p , c x m size - = ;
where  T
t , p , c m is defined as total imports of country c of product p at time t;
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where 2d includes all the tariff lines within the same 2-digit category of the SITC
classification;
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where  1 t , j , c - y  is the bilateral trade flow (exports + imports) of newspapers between
country c and country j; Finally,
￿ = ￿
„
- - - -
c j
1 t , p , j , c 1 t , p , j 1 t , p 1 t , c n s S N
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